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 Executive Summary 
 
We examine the incentives that public enterprises may have to undertake 
anticompetitive activities. These activities include setting prices below marginal cost, 
raising the operating costs of existing rivals, erecting entry barriers to preclude the 
operation of new competitors, and circumventing regulations designed to foster 
competition. We find that public enterprises often have stronger incentives to pursue 
these activities than do their private, profit-maximizing counterparts. 1These statistics are consistent with Short’s (1984, p. 118) earlier findings that, on average, public enterprises
accounted for 8.6 percent of GDP and 27.0 percent of capital formation in the late 1970s. The corresponding
percentages for Africa were 17.5 and 32.4, respectively.
2The U.S. Postal Service, for example, is required by statute to consider the fairness, equity, and simplicity of its rate
structure as well as the relationships among prices, production costs, and the value of the service provided (39 U.S.C.
§ 3622).
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior
by Public Enterprises
David E. M. Sappington  and   J. Gregory Sidak
1.  Introduction.
Most formal analyses of competition among firms assume that firms act to maximize their profit.
This is a reasonable approximation in many settings. But public enterprises do not typically seek to
maximize profit, and public enterprises compete directly with private, profit-maximizing enterprises
in many important markets. In the United States, for example, the U.S. Postal Service provides
overnight mail and package shipping services in direct competition with private delivery companies.
Many public hospitals and educational institutions also compete directly with private suppliers of
similar services. Production by public enterprises is even more widespread in many other countries.
To illustrate, during the 1980s public enterprises accounted for approximately 14 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in African nations, and for approximately 11 percent of GDP in developing
countries as a whole (World Bank , 1995, p. 30).
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Because public enterprises are often charged with objectives other than profit maximization, one
might suspect that public enterprises would act less aggressively toward their competitors than would
their profit-maximizing counterparts.
2 This is generally not the case, though. We identify a variety of
plausible settings in which public enterprises have stronger incentives than profit-maximizing firms
to pursue activities that disadvantage competitors. Quite often, the less concerned is the public
enterprise with profit, the stronger are its incentives to undertake activities that disadvantage
competitors. These activities include setting prices below cost, misstating costs and choosing3Salop (1979), Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987), Brock (1983), Salop et al. (1984), Krattenmaker and Salop (1986),
Ordover and Saloner (1989), and Economides (1998), among others, analyze the incentives for profit-maximizing firms
to raise their rivals’ operating costs.
4The welfare loss in Cremer et al.’s (1991) model arises because the presence of a public enterprises induces private
firms to choose more similar qualities, which is detrimental to consumers. The loss in De Fraja and Delbono’s (1989)
model occurs because the public enterprise produces a disproportionate share of industry output, thereby raising total
production costs.
5Lott (1999) reiterates this observation and provides some supporting empirical evidence.
6See Baumol (1984), Ruys (1988), Cremer et al. (1989), Delbono and Rossini (1992), Delbono and Denicolo (1993),
MacAvoy and McIsaac (1995), Hansmann (1996), Cremer et al. (1997), Hart et al. (1997), and  Shleifer (1998), among
others, for some analyses of this issue.
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inefficient technologies in order to circumvent restrictions on below-cost pricing, raising the operating
costs of existing rivals, and erecting entry barriers to preclude the operation of new competitors.
Our analysis differs from other analyses in the literature because we focus on the strategic actions
that a public enterprise might undertake to disadvantage competitors and  evade regulations designed
to foster competition. Although others have shown that profit-maximizing firms may pursue some
of these actions, we demonstrate that public enterprises will often have the incentive to pursue these
actions even more aggressively.
3 Since these actions can reduce welfare, our findings complement
those of other researchers who have shown that the operation of a public enterprise can be
detrimental even when the public enterprise seeks to maximize social welfare (Cremer et al., 1991;
De Fraja and  Delbono, 1989).
4 Our analysis also extends Lott’s (1990) important observation that
public enterprises may set prices below marginal production costs and thereby harm competition and
reduce welfare.
5 We extend Lott’s analysis by specifying precisely when a public enterprise will price
below marginal cost and how the prices that a public enterprise sets vary as its concern with profit
varies.
We do not provide a comprehensive assessment of the benefits and costs of public enterprises.
In particular, we do not analyze why the operation of public enterprises may be preferred to
operation by private, profit-maximizing firms.
6 We also abstract from any innate cost differences7Boardman and Vining (1989) provide a review of the empirical literature that addresses this issue.
8Our focus throughout is on public enterprises. However, to the extent that private, nonprofit firms share similar
objectives with public enterprises, some of our conclusions may pertain to nonprofit firms. See Hansmann (1996),
Salamon and Anheier (1996), Rose-Ackerman (1996), and Weisbrod (1997) for recent analyses of nonprofit
organizations.
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between public and private enterprises.
7 Therefore, our research is not designed to deliver broad
policy prescriptions regarding the proper scope of public enterprises. Our analysis does suggest,
however, that the incentives that public enterprises have to engage in various forms of anticompetitive
behavior deserve careful consideration in any comprehensive assessment of the benefits and costs of
public enterprises.
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Our formal analysis begins in section 2, where we examine the prices that a public enterprise
would set in the absence of any pricing restrictions. The analysis provides sufficient conditions for
a public enterprise to set prices below marginal production costs. In section 3, we investigate some
of the methods that a public enterprise might employ to relax a binding prohibition against below-cost
pricing. We show that a public enterprise will typically have stronger incentives than a profit-
maximizing firm to manipulate accounting data in order to understate marginal costs and to over-
invest in capital in order to reduce marginal production costs.
Section 4 examines the incentives of a public enterprise to raise the costs of existing rivals and
to erect barriers to keep potential rivals from entering the market. We identify plausible conditions
under which a public enterprise will have stronger incentives to undertake these activities than will
a private, profit-maximizing firm. Conclusions and directions for future research are discussed in
section 5. The proofs of all formal results are provided in the Appendix.
2.  Public Enterprise Pricing.
In this section, we examine the prices that a public enterprise will set for its products. We first
show how the prices preferred by a public enterprise can be characterized by a modified inverse-9 Universal service -- providing high-quality service that is affordable to all citizens -- is one such common goal.
10As Baumol (1959, pp. 32, 45) points out, “In ordinary business parlance the term ‘sales’ refers not to the number of
physical units ... but, rather, to the total revenue obtained by the firm from the purchases of its customers”.
Furthermore, “In the near universal multi-product firm any measure of overall physical volume must involve index
number problems, and the adoption of a value measure is doubtless to be expected”.
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elasticity rule. Then we demonstrate how a public enterprise will alter the prices it charges as it
becomes less concerned with the profit it generates. Finally, we examine the conditions under which
a public enterprise will set prices below marginal production costs.
In contrast to the typical private firm in a capitalist society, a public enterprise seldom seeks
solely to maximize the profit it generates. The profit that public enterprises are permitted to earn is
often explicitly limited, and public enterprises are commonly instructed to pursue goals that are
distinct from, if not fundamentally incompatible with, profit maximization.
9 In addition, the managers
of public enterprises often have considerable discretion to pursue their own objectives. This discretion
stems in part from the fact that public enterprises are not subject to takeover threats and are generally
less subject to the discipline of capital markets than are private enterprises (Geddes, 1994, 1999;
Oster, 1995). In practice, managers of public enterprises often have considerable interest in expanding
the scale or scope of their activities (Niskanen, 1971, 1975), in part because a manager’s abilities are
often inferred from the size of the operations that he or she oversees.
The revenue that an operation generates often serves as a proxy for the size and scope of the
operation.
10 Therefore, as one representation of a public enterprise’s reduced focus on profit and its
expanded focus on operational scale, we assume that the public enterprise seeks to maximize a
weighted average of revenue and profit. The parameter   will denote the weight that the
public enterprise places on revenue and   will denote the corresponding weight on profit.
Although we focus on this objective in the ensuing analysis, most of our qualitative conclusions hold
more generally (for example, when the public enterprise seeks to maximize a weighted average of11Expanded output can also promote expanded employment, which can be a goal of public enterprises (Geddes, 1999).
12This assumption allows us to focus on the necessary conditions for a solution to the public enterprise’s problem.
Concavity in prices is facilitated by two assumptions that are maintained throughout: (1) demand is a concave function
of price ( , where primes denote derivatives); and (2) either marginal production costs increase with
output ( ) or they decline with output less rapidly than price declines with output along the inverse
demand curve ( ).
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output and profit). The critical assumption is that the public enterprise values expanded output more
highly than does its profit-maximizing counterpart.
11
We assume that the public enterprise supplies   products. Let   denote the price of
the i
th product, and  p  the vector of prices for all   products. Also let   denote
the demand for the public enterprise’s i
th product and Q   the vector of demands
for the public enterprise’s   products. C(Q) will denote the public enterprise’s cost of producing
output Q. The public enterprise is assumed to choose prices to maximize:
.   (2.1)
The first term in square brackets in expression (2.1) is the public enterprise’s total revenue. The last
term in square brackets is the public enterprise’s profit. Thus, expression (2.1) is simply the
aforementioned weighted average of revenue and profit.
For analytic simplicity, we will focus throughout on the case of independent demands (so
  for all  ) and separable production costs. In this case, demand for the public
enterprise’s i
th product can be written as  , and the public enterprise’s cost function can be
expressed as C(Q) =  . We will also assume that the public enterprise’s problem is
concave.
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Lemma 1 characterizes the public enterprise’s preferred prices. The lemma refers to 
, which is the price elasticity of demand for the public enterprise’s i
th product.
Lemma 1.  The public enterprise’s preferred prices are determined by the following modified inverse-6
elasticity rule:
 . (2.2)
Expression (2.2) can be viewed as a modified inverse-elasticity rule (Ramsey, 1927; Baumol and
Bradford, 1970). The public enterprise implements proportional mark-ups of price over modified
marginal cost  ( ) that vary inversely with the price elasticity of demand. Prices
are set further above cost the more inelastic is the demand for the product. This pricing rule is the
same rule that a profit-maximizing firm follows, except that marginal costs are scaled down by the
factor   to reflect the public enterprise’s reduced focus on profit. The greater is its focus on
revenue rather than profit (that is, the larger is w), the more the public enterprise discounts marginal
costs in the modified inverse-elasticity rule.
Expression (2.2) provides the following conclusion:
Lemma 2.  The less profit-oriented is the public enterprise, the lower the price it will set for each of
its products (that is,    for all  i = 1, ..., n).
The magnitudes of the price reductions that a public enterprise implements as it becomes less
profit-oriented generally vary with the shapes of the relevant demand and cost curves. Lemma 3
specifies conditions under which a reduced focus on profit leads the public enterprise to increase the
extent to which it implements relatively high proportional mark-ups of price above cost on products
with inelastic demand.13We assume all constant elasticity demand functions represent elastic demands    This assumption rules
out unrealistic cases in which the public enterprise can generate unbounded profit by setting an arbitrarily high price
for a product.
14The conclusion in Lemma 3 also holds if the public enterprise faces linear demands and constant marginal production
costs. Simulations reveal that the conclusion also holds more generally.
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Lemma 3.  Suppose the public enterprise faces constant elasticity demand functions.
13 Then the less
profit-oriented is the public enterprise, the greater is the difference in proportional price-cost
mark-ups it will implement for products with less elastic versus more elastic demand (that is, if
 where    for all  i = 1, ..., n,  then    for
).
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Lemma 3 reflects the fact that as the public enterprise becomes more concerned with revenue
relative to profit, it becomes less averse to the higher costs that arise from increased output.
Consequently, the public enterprise favors more highly the expanded output and revenue that result
when the prices of products with more elastic demand are reduced. In practice, a public enterprise
often faces the most elastic demand on those products for which competition from alternative
suppliers is most pronounced. Lemma 3 suggests that when this is the case, a reduced focus on profit
may lead the public enterprise to allocate price reductions disproportionately toward those products
for which it faces the most intense competition.
This conclusion supports Lott’s (1990) observation that a public enterprise might set the price
of a product below its marginal cost of production. Equation (2.1) and Lemma 3 suggest that below-
cost pricing is most likely when the public enterprise’s focus on profit is limited and when the demand
for the public enterprise’s product is elastic. Observations 1A and 1B confirm this intuition and
extend Lott’s (1990) observation by providing sufficient conditions for a public enterprise to price8
below marginal cost.
Observation 1A.  Suppose the public enterprise faces constant elasticity demand functions
( ). Then the public enterprise will set price below marginal cost on those
products for which the price elasticity of demand exceeds  1/w.
Observation 1B.  Suppose the public enterprise faces linear demand functions 
 and quadratic production costs  . Then the
public enterprise will set price below marginal cost on those products for which 1 > w >
 .
Corollary 1.  Suppose the conditions of Observation 1B hold and the public enterprise’s marginal
cost is zero when output is zero (that is,  ). Then the public enterprise will set the price
of its  product below marginal cost if     and   .
  Observations 1A and 1B reflect the fact that even though profit declines as price is reduced
below marginal cost, revenue can increase as price declines. Therefore, if the public enterprise’s
relative valuation of revenue is sufficiently pronounced and/or if demand is sufficiently elastic, the
public enterprise may choose to set prices below marginal production costs. To illustrate, Observation
1A reports that if the public enterprise faces constant-elasticity demand functions and values profit
and revenue equally, then it will set prices below marginal cost on all products for which the price
elasticity of demand exceeds 2.15The public enterprise will not price below marginal cost if its marginal cost does not vary with output. This
conclusion is sensitive to the presumed objective of the public enterprise, however. If the public enterprise seeks to
maximize a weighted average of output and profit (rather than revenue and profit), the public enterprise that operates
with linear demand ( ) and constant marginal cost (c) will price below marginal cost if
.
16This fact underlies Lott’s (1990, 1999) observation that a public enterprise’s threat to price below marginal cost may
be more credible than the identical threat of a profit-maximizing firm. 
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Observation 1B and Corollary 1 consider the case of linear demands and quadratic production
costs. In this case, the public enterprise is more likely to price below marginal cost the less profit-
oriented it is, the more rapidly marginal costs rise with output,
15 and the more sensitive is demand to
price (that is, the larger are  , and  ). These conclusions emerge because a reduced focus on
profit renders output expansion more attractive to the public enterprise. Furthermore, a more steeply
sloped marginal cost curve and a flatter inverse demand curve increase the likelihood that the
marginal cost curve will lie above the inverse demand curve as output expands beyond the profit-
maximizing level.
Observations 1A and 1B reveal that even in the absence of any predatory intent, a public
enterprise may set prices so low that they do not cover marginal production costs.
16 In doing so, the
public enterprise may drive a more efficient profit-maximizing firm from the market. It will do so, for
example, if the competitor operates with a constant marginal cost that lies above the public
enterprise’s preferred price and below the public enterprise’s marginal cost of production.
3.  Avoiding Restrictions on Below-Cost Pricing.
The analysis to this point has focused on the prices that a public enterprise will set when its
pricing flexibility is unrestricted. In practice, a public enterprise may face restrictions on feasible
prices. For example, a public enterprise may be prohibited from pricing below marginal cost, as17In American law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity may shield public enterprises of the federal or state governments
from application of the antitrust laws. In addition, public enterprises of state or municipal governments may be exempt
from the antitrust laws under the state action immunity. See Areeda and Hovenkamp (1999,   2.12). If neither
immunity applies, the public enterprise will be subject to general antitrust constraints, including those on below-cost
pricing.
18See Sidak and Spulber (1996, pp. 105-126).
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private, profit-maximizing firms typically are.
17 The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, we
illustrate how a public enterprise might attempt to relax a binding prohibition against below-cost
pricing. Second, and more importantly, we show that a public enterprise typically has stronger
incentives than a profit-maximizing firm to devote resources to relaxing this prohibition.
A.  Manipulating Accounting Data.
One obvious way in which a firm might attempt to relax a binding constraint against pricing
below marginal cost is to manipulate accounting data so as to understate realized marginal cost.
18
Such understatement might be achieved by classifying as overhead (fixed) production costs some or
all of the costs that truly vary as output varies. For example, the firm might count some of the
personnel hired to supply the product in question as central management. An alternate way for the
firm to understate its realized marginal cost is to record as variable costs incurred in the provision of
a different product costs that are truly incurred in producing the product whose price the firm would
like to set below marginal cost. For example, the firm might claim that materials and supplies
employed to produce the product in question were employed to produce a different product.
Intentional understatement of marginal production costs is likely to entail personal risk. Laws
against fraud can carry severe financial penalties, and career prospects can be dimmed for managers
who are even suspected of knowingly reporting false information. We capture these and other costs
of understating marginal production costs in the function  , which denotes the firm’s expected19Formally,   and    for all  . It is also convenient to assume that the costs of
understatement initially increase slowly but eventually increase very rapidly with u, that is,   and
.
20The presumed concavity of   is ensured if, for example, demand is linear and marginal cost increases with
output at an increasing rate or if demand is concave and marginal cost is constant.
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disutility or cost of understating marginal cost by u dollars. This disutility is assumed to increase at
an increasing rate with the degree of understatement.
19 So as not to bias our analysis against the
public enterprise, we analyze the case in which the public enterprise views the costs of manipulating
accounting data exactly as a profit-maximizing firm does. In particular, the public enterprise bears the
full costs ( ) of the manipulation, and does not discount these costs by the factor  , as it
implicitly discounts production costs.
The public enterprise’s problem in this setting with possible cost understatement, labeled
, is:
(3.1)
subject to : . (3.2) 
Expression (3.1) reflects the public enterprise’s desire to maximize a weighted average of
revenue and profit less the disutility associated with understating marginal cost. Expression (3.2)
captures the prohibition against pricing below measured marginal cost, which is true marginal cost
( ) less any understatement (u) of marginal cost. For simplicity, we assume that the public
enterprise produces only one product, but the conclusion reported in Observation 2 holds more
generally.
20
Observation 2.  In the setting with possible cost understatement, the public enterprise will understate
its marginal cost of production in order to relax a binding prohibition against pricing below cost.21The overhead cost could include labor. The critical feature of overhead cost is that it does not vary with the level of
output produced by the firm.
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The less profit-oriented is the public enterprise, the more it will understate its marginal cost (that
is,   and   > 0  when constraint (3.2) binds at the solution to  ).
Observation 2 reveals that when they face the same risks from understating costs, a public
enterprise will typically understate its marginal cost more than will a profit-maximizing firm. The
public enterprise is willing to bear the higher costs that accompany more pronounced understatement
because it values more highly the expanded output and revenue that result from the lower price that
the understatement facilitates.
B.  Strategic Choice of Technology.
Now consider a more subtle strategy that the public enterprise might pursue to relax a binding
prohibition against pricing below cost. Suppose that instead of misstating realized marginal cost, the
firm chooses an inefficient operating technology that secures a relatively low marginal cost at the
expense of a particularly high overhead (fixed) cost of production. In practice, a firm might do so by
installing general-purpose equipment on a large scale and thereby reduce the need for project-specific
equipment, or by retaining a large on-site staff with broad legal, engineering, computing, and/or
marketing expertise that can substitute for specific expertise on individual products.
To capture this tradeoff formally, suppose the public enterprise has a choice among production
technologies and suppose this choice is  indexed by the amount of overhead (fixed) productive
resources the firm employs. Let   denote the level of overhead resources, which we call capital
for expositional convenience.
21 We will denote by   the unit cost of capital. The more capital
the firm installs, the lower are its variable and marginal costs of production. Formally, 22To ensure an interior choice of F, it is convenient to assume   and   .
23Diminishing returns to increasing F are also assumed. In particular, increases in F decrease variable costs and
marginal costs at a decreasing rate (so    and  ).
24Baseman (1971) and Spence (1977) illustrate how a profit-maximizing firm might employ an inefficient technology
to deter entry. Brennan (1990) and Crew and Crocker (1991) explain how a regulated, profit-maximizing firm might
choose an inefficient technology in order to arbitrage cost allocation rules.
25Formally,  .
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and   , where   is the variable cost of producing output Q when F units of
capital are installed, and where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
22, 
23
The public enterprise’s problem in this setting with strategic choice of technology, labeled
, is:
(3.3)
subject to: . (3.4)
Expression (3.3) reflects the public enterprise’s desire to maximize a weighted average of revenue
and profit (where profit is the difference between revenue and the sum of variable and capital costs).
Expression (3.4) restricts the price chosen by the public enterprise to exceed its marginal cost of
production ( ).
Of central interest is whether a public enterprise might be particularly inclined to choose an
inefficient technology in order to relax a binding prohibition on pricing below cost.
24 Observation 3
reports that this is the case. The Observation refers to  , which is the level of capital that
minimizes the cost of producing Q units of output.
25
Observation 3.  In the setting with strategic choice of technology, the public enterprise will over-
invest in capital to relax a binding prohibition on pricing below cost. The less profit-oriented is26See Sidak and Spulber (1996), for example.
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the public enterprise, the more it will over-invest in capital (that is,   and  
when constraint (3.4) binds at the solution to [P - F] ). 
The more highly the public enterprise values revenue relative to profit, the more it benefits from
the expanded output and revenue that a lower price provides, and thus the greater the technological
inefficiency it will endure to secure a lower price. Observation 3 reports that the public enterprise will
install an inefficiently large level of capital in order to reduce its marginal cost even if it faces the same
market cost of capital that private enterprises face. If the public enterprise’s capital purchases are
subsidized (as they often are in practice, since public enterprises are commonly afforded privileged
access to government funds)
26, then inefficient over-capitalization becomes even more pronounced,
as Corollary 2 reports.
Corollary 2.  The public enterprise’s over-investment in capital to relax a binding restriction on
pricing below cost will be more pronounced the more heavily its capital purchases are subsidized
(that is,    when constraint (3.4) binds at the solution to  ).
In sum, it is apparent that by strategically relaxing a binding prohibition against below-cost
pricing, a public enterprise may disadvantage its competitors. Section 4 next considers alternative
methods that a public enterprise might employ to disadvantage its competitors.
4.  Raising Rivals’ Costs.
Other activities that firms might undertake that can serve to disadvantage their rivals include15
lobbying for regulations that increase rivals’ operating costs, restricting rivals’ access to essential
productive inputs, and buying excessive amounts of inputs in order to raise their market price (Salop,
1979; Brock, 1983; Salop et al., 1984; Salop and Scheffman, 1983, 1987; Krattenmaker and Salop,
1986). In this section, we show that public enterprises often have stronger incentives than their profit-
maximizing counterparts to engage in such activities. We examine three representative settings: (1)
where the public enterprise and a fringe of competitive firms produce a homogeneous product; (2)
where the public enterprise and a rival produce differentiated products; and (3) where the public
enterprise enjoys a monopoly position and can undertake actions that promote the continued
exclusion of competitors. 
A.  Dominant Firm Setting.
Consider, first, the setting where the public enterprise is a dominant firm that faces a fringe of
competitive suppliers of an identical product. The public enterprise chooses a price, recognizing that
the fringe will take this price as given and deliver the output that maximizes the fringe’s profit. The
public enterprise then supplies the residual demand,  , which is the difference between market
demand ( ) and fringe supply ( ) at the chosen price. 
Fringe supply is determined by its cost function. Denote by   the fringe’s cost of
producing output Q when the public enterprise invests resources   to raise its rivals’ costs.
Cost-raising expenditures by the public enterprise increase both the total and the marginal cost of the
fringe (so,   and  , where subscripts denote partial derivatives). They also raise
the public enterprise’s production costs (so  ). The fringe produces with increasing
marginal cost (so  ).
The public enterprise’s problem is to choose a price (p) and cost-raising expenditures (r) to16
maximize its objective function. This problem, labeled  , is the following:
    (4.1)
subject to: =  ;   and (4.2)
=  . (4.3)
Expression (4.1) reflects the public enterprise’s objective of maximizing a weighted average of
revenue and profit. Equation (4.2) defines the residual demand facing the public enterprise as the
difference between market demand and the supply of the competitive fringe. Equation (4.3) identifies
the output of the competitive fringe as the level of output that maximizes the fringe’s profit, given
the market price (p) and the cost-raising activities (r) of the public enterprise.
The following conditions help to determine the extent to which the public enterprise will attempt
to raise its rivals’ costs.
(C1)   , where   is the public enterprise’s output at the
solution to   when  .
(C2)       at the solution to  .
Condition (C1) says that the incremental benefit from initial amounts of the cost-raising activity
outweigh the associated incremental cost. The incremental benefit ( / )
is the vertical shift in the public enterprise’s residual demand curve that arises from the reduction in
the fringe’s output as its costs increase. The incremental cost is the increase in the public enterprise’s
average cost, discounted by the factor 1 - w, which reflects the public enterprise’s diminished focus27Condition (C1) is analogous to expression (5) in Salop and Scheffman (1987, p. 23), with the exception of the
discount factor, 1 - w.
28As the slope of the fringe’s supply curve declines, residual demand declines more rapidly as the market price
increases. The reduced residual demand is disadvantageous for the public enterprise.    
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on profit.
27 Notice that the value of the public enterprise’s objective function when it supplies output
Q is  . Therefore, the public enterprise’s objective function increases
whenever   rises more rapidly than  , holding Q constant. This explains why the
public enterprise optimally undertakes some cost-raising activity whenever condition (C1) holds.
Condition (C2) ensures that a public enterprise will be more aggressive in raising its rivals’ costs
than an otherwise identical profit-maximizing firm. The condition simply requires that the
predominant effect of the cost-raising activity be to increase the public enterprise’s residual demand
by decreasing the fringe’s supply. This effect ( ) must outweigh any adverse impact on
the public enterprise of higher marginal costs  , higher total costs  , or decreased
slope of the fringe’s supply curve 
28 Condition (C2) will be satisfied, for example, if: (1)
the cost-raising activity does not affect the public enterprise’s marginal cost of production (that is,
 for all Q and r); and (2) the impact of higher r on the rival’s marginal cost does not vary
with the level of output (as when    ,  where    0
and   ).
Observation 4.  Suppose conditions (C1) and (C2) hold. Then the public enterprise will act to raise
its rivals’ costs, and will do so more extensively the less profit-oriented it is (that is,    and
 at the solution to  ).
Observation 4 indicates that as long as the public enterprise’s activities raise the fringe’s cost29For expositional simplicity, we abstract from fixed costs of production.
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more than they raise its own cost, the public enterprise will raise its rivals’ costs more aggressively
than will a profit-maximizing firm. The additional aggression by the public enterprise is motivated by
its reduced focus on profit. The reduced focus on profit effectively renders the cost of expanded
output less onerous for the public enterprise. The public enterprise secures the expanded output that
it values highly by reducing the output of its rivals via raising their costs.
B.  Duopoly Interaction.
It is important to determine whether a public enterprise’s incentive to raise its rivals’ costs
persists in settings other than those considered in Observation 4. In practice, public enterprises are
not always dominant firms facing a fringe of competitive suppliers, and their products often differ
from those of their competitors. Therefore, it is instructive to consider the following simple setting
where the public enterprise is one of two firms producing differentiated products. The two firms
establish prices for their products simultaneously after learning the amount (r) by which the public
enterprise has raised its rival’s constant marginal cost of production ( ). For simplicity, the public
enterprise is assumed to incur a separable cost,  , that increases at an increasing rate with its cost-
raising activity (that is,   and   for all  ). To illustrate, this cost might
constitute expected penalties for anticompetitive behavior or the costs of lobbying for regulations that
restrict its rival’s access to key inputs (for example, transmission or delivery media). The public
enterprise’s production cost is c per unit.
29
The higher is the price that one firm sets for its product, the greater is the demand for the other
firm’s product. This is why the public enterprise may act to raise its rival’s marginal cost of30Notice that in this formulation, the public enterprise bears the full costs  of  r, and does not discount these
cost by 1 - w, as it implicitly discounts production costs. It is apparent that if   is sufficiently large for all r, no
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production, even though doing so is personally costly. As its marginal cost increases, the rival
increases the price it charges for its product, thereby increasing the demand for the public enterprise’s
product. For analytic simplicity, demand curves are assumed to be linear in prices. The public
enterprise’s demand curve is:
 ; (4.4)
and the rival’s demand curve is:
 , (4.5)
where   is the price the public enterprise sets for its product,   is the price of the rival’s
product, and   and  , are all strictly positive constants. Each firm’s demand is
assumed to be more responsive to changes in its own price than to changes in its competitor’s price
(that is,   and  ). In addition, demand for the public enterprise’s product is substantial
in the sense that the intercept of the public enterprise’s demand curve exceeds the public enterprise’s
marginal cost of production (c) even when the rival’s price ( ) is zero.
The public enterprise’s problem in this duopoly setting, labeled  , is the following:
             (4.6)
subject to: (4.4); (4.5);
;    and (4.7)
. (4.8)
Expression (4.6) reflect’s the public enterprise’s desire to maximize a weighted average of
revenue and profit, less the cost of raising its rival’s cost.
30 Expressions (4.7) and (4.8) reflect the factfirm will act to raise its rival’s cost. We abstract from this possibility by assuming   and   .
We also avoid the situation in which the public enterprise raises its rival’s cost so much that the rival exits the market.
We do so by assuming   and   are sufficiently large for all  r > 0. Sufficient conditions are   >
  and   , where    is the optimal   for
the public enterprise at the solution to  , and where  .
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that the public enterprise and its rival choose prices simultaneously to maximize their objectives, after
observing the extent of the public enterprise’s cost-raising activities, r. The key features of the
solution to  are recorded in Observation 5.
Observation 5.  In the duopoly setting, the public enterprise will raise its rival’s cost, and will do so
to a greater extent the less profit-oriented it is (that is,   and   at the solution to
).
A public enterprise will raise its rival’s cost more extensively than will a profit-maximizing firm
ceteris paribus because the public enterprise is more eager than its profit-maximizing counterpart to
expand output. Consequently, the public enterprise raises its rival’s cost more dramatically in order
to restrict its rival’s supply more severely, and thereby increase the demand for its own product more
extensively.
C.  Excluding Potential Competitors.
In addition to raising the operating costs of an existing rival, a public enterprise may undertake
activities designed to preclude the operation of potential rivals. For example, the public enterprise
may lobby key policymakers to erect impenetrable entry barriers, such as outright prohibitions on
entry. To determine whether a public enterprise has more or less incentive than a private, profit-
maximizing enterprise to undertake such exclusionary activities, consider the following simple model.31Formally,   and   for all  . To ensure an interior value for e, we assume
  and   .
32Because competition reduces the demand for the public enterprise’s product, the equilibrium value of the public
enterprise’s objective function declines when competition is admitted.
33  will be concave in  and   if, for example, the demand curves facing the public enterprise are
concave and if its cost function is convex.
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Let  denote the probability that potential competitors are excluded from the
market in which the public enterprise operates. This probability increases at a decreasing rate with
the effort,  , that the public enterprise devotes to securing exclusion.
31 The unit cost of effort is
normalized to 1. If competitors are excluded from the market, the public enterprise faces the demand
curve  , where p is the price that the public enterprise charges for its product. If competitors
are not excluded, the public enterprise faces demand curve  . Competition reduces demand for
the public enterprise’s product, so   for all  .
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Let   denote the price that the public enterprise will set for its product if its efforts to exclude
competitors are successful. Let   denote the corresponding price if its efforts are unsuccessful.
Then the public enterprise’s problem in this setting with potential exclusion (denoted  ) is the
following.
33
    
    . (4.9)
Observation 6.  In the setting with potential exclusion, the public enterprise will undertake
exclusionary effort. The level of exclusionary effort increases as the public enterprise becomes
less profit-oriented whenever competition reduces the public enterprise’s output (that is,  e  >34A public enterprise can have even greater incentive to exclude rivals when its production technology exhibits cost
complementarities. To illustrate this point, suppose that a public enterprise produces two products, A and B, and that
product B is also supplied by competitors. Further suppose that the firm’s marginal cost of producing product B
declines as its output of product A increases. In this setting, if the public enterprise successfully precludes competition
on product A and thereby increases its output of product A, the public enterprise reduces its marginal cost of delivering
product B.  By doing so, the public enterprise is likely to strengthen its competitive position and so increase its output
in the market for product B. Therefore, in the presence of cost complementarities, the public enterprise can secure
benefits in multiple markets by limiting competition in one market.
22
0  and, if   at the solution to  ).
As the public enterprise becomes less profit-oriented (so w increases), it implicitly discounts its
production costs more highly, and therefore finds the extra cost of higher output less onerous.
Consequently, when exclusion of rivals leads to more output by the public enterprise, it will find
exclusion to be particularly valuable as w increases, and so it optimally increases its exclusionary
activities. There are many settings in which the public enterprise will sell more output when
competition is precluded than when it is admitted. One important setting is when potential
competitors have lower costs than the public enterprise and pricing below marginal cost is prohibited.
In this setting, if the firms engage in price competition and produce a homogenous product with
constant marginal cost, the public enterprise will be driven from the market when more efficient
suppliers are authorized to produce. Consequently, as Observation 6 reveals, the public enterprise has
particularly strong incentives in this setting to act aggressively to exclude rivals.
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5.    Conclusions.
We have shown how the diverse goals that a public enterprise faces may provide it with
particularly strong incentives to act as an aggressive competitor. A reduced focus on profit was
shown to lead the public enterprise to price certain products below cost, to raise the costs of existing
rivals, to erect entry barriers to preclude entry by potential rivals, and to understate costs and adopt23
inefficient production technologies in order to circumvent regulations designed to foster competition.
Each of these activities can preclude the operation of more efficient competitors, and thereby reduce
social welfare.
We have analyzed selected anticompetitive activities that public enterprises might undertake. We
have not undertaken a comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of public enterprises. Therefore, our
analysis alone cannot provide broad policy prescriptions regarding the proper scope of public
enterprises. However, the fact that public enterprises may pursue anticompetitive actions particularly
aggressively suggests that the costs of public enterprises need to be weighed carefully against any
benefits that such firms may provide.
A comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of public enterprises is beyond the scope of this research.
Such an analysis would need to consider other possible objectives of the public enterprise,  including
national security and income redistribution. The analysis would also need to consider market failures
that a public enterprise might help to correct, and contrast the internal operations of public and
private enterprises. The analysis should also endow the public enterprise with a richer set of policy
instruments, including non-linear and discriminatory prices, products of varying quality, and different
intensities of product and process innovation.
A comprehensive assessment of the merits of public enterprises would also need to account for
the fact that public enterprises often face some regulations, even though the regulations can be less
stringent than those faced by private firms that operate in regulated industries (Sidak and Spulber,
1996, pp. 83-100). The optimal design of regulatory policy for public enterprises has received little
attention in the literature, and deserves careful study. It is important to determine, for example,
whether the benefits that price-cap regulation can provide when applied to profit-maximizing firms
persist when price-cap regulation is applied to public enterprises. It is conceivable, for example, that24
a public enterprise might have greater incentive than its private counterpart to set prices strategically
in order to relax a binding price-cap constraint (Sappington and Sibley, 1992; Law, 1997; and
Foreman, 1995), or to employ the expanded freedoms of price-cap regulation to price below marginal
cost (Armstrong and Vickers, 1993).
The optimal design of antitrust law as applied to public enterprises also merits extensive study.
We have shown that a public enterprise may have greater incentive to engage in anticompetitive
practices and circumvent antitrust laws than its private counterpart. Therefore, more stringent
antitrust laws and harsher penalties for violating these laws may be appropriate for public enterprises.
Such legislation or enforcement policy would necessarily raise the question of the proper scope of
sovereign immunity for the proprietary, as opposed to political, actions of governments. Of course,
financial penalties may have little force if the public enterprise is able to pass financial penalties on
to taxpayers.
In short, the incentives for anticompetitive behavior by public enterprises invite further
theoretical and empirical research on a wide range of issues. In turn, that research will have the
opportunity to inform an emerging body of public policy having great practical significance in many
nations.25
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Proof of Lemma 1.
Setting the derivative of (2.1) with respect to   equal to zero provides:
(A L1.1)
Rearranging (A L1.1) provides:
  (A L1.2)
Dividing both sides of equation (A L1.2) by   and substituting for  provides equation (2.2). 
Proof of Lemma 2.
  from (A L1.1).   (A L2.1)
Therefore, since concavity of (2.1) ensures   it follows from (A L1.1) and (A L2.1) that 
      (A L2.2)
Proof of Lemma 3.
Let   denote the (constant) price elasticities of demand for products i and j, respectively.
Equation (2.2) implies:
  (A L3.1)
Equation (2.2) reveals that in the present setting:
  (A L3.2)
Rearranging equation (A L3.2) provides:
  (A L3.3)
Substituting equation (A L3.3) and its counterpart for product j into equation (A L3.1) and
rearranging terms provides: -2-
  (A L3.4)
Differentiating (A L3.4) with respect to w provides:
   as         (A L3.5)
Proof of Observation 1A.
Since    in the present setting, it follows from equation (A L1.1) that the
public enterprise’s preferred price for product i is given by:
  (A1.1)
Rearranging the terms in (A1.1) and simplifying provides:
  (A1.2)
Subtracting  from both sides of the equality in (A1.2) provides:
  if and only if        (A1.3)
Proof of Observation 1B.
Since      and      in the present setting, it follows from
equation (A L1.1) that the public enterprise’s preferred price for product i is given by:
(A1.4)
Rearranging the terms in (A1.4) and simplifying provides:
  (A1.5)
It follows from (A1.5) that   if and only if:-3-
  (A1.6)
Straightforward manipulation of terms reveals that inequality (A1.6) holds if and only if:
    (A1.7)
Proof of Corollary 1.
The corollary follows immediately from equation (A1.7), once   is set to 0.  
Proof of Observation 2.
Let    denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (3.2). Then the Lagrangean
function associated with problem   is :
  (A2.1)




Since    and    by assumption,   from (A2.3).
Let    denote the matrix of second order partial derivatives     It
follows  
from (A2.2) - (A2.4) that   Cramer’s rule implies:
  (A2.5)
From (A2.2),     and   Therefore, from-4-
(A2.5),    
Proof of Observation 3.
Let    denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (3.4). Then the Lagrangean
function associated with problem   is:
  (A3.1)




Since  and   by assumption, (A3.3) implies:
  (A3.5)
Since   (A3.5) implies  
Define    The second order conditions for an interior maximum require:
  (A3.6)
Furthermore, Cramer’s Rule implies:
  (A3.7)
It follows from (A3.2) - (A3.4) that   
  and       from (A3.5). Therefore, from (A3.7),-5-
Proof of Corollary 2.
From (A3.2) - (A3.4) and (A3.6), Cramer’s rule implies:
 
Proof of Observation 4.
The necessary conditions for a solution to   are:
 and  (A4.1)
(A4.2)
Solving (A4.1) for    substituting into (A4.2), and dividing by    provides:
  (A4.3)
Since    ,  it follows from (A4.3) that 
if 
condition (C1) holds.
Define    The second order conditions for an interior solution to 
require   and    Cramer’s rule implies:
  (A4.4)
From (A4.1) and (A4.2):-6-
(A4.5)
 and  (A4.6)
  (A4.7)
After some simplification, it follows from (A4.5) - (A4.7) that 
       
  (A4.8)
Notice that   from (A4.1). Therefore, the expression in (A4.8) will be strictly
positive if   and:
            (A4.9)
Substituting for   from (A4.2), it is apparent that the inequality in (A4.9) will hold
if and only if:
  (A4.10)
Dividing both sides of inequality (A4.10) by   reveals that the inequality will hold if (C2) holds.
Therefore, from (A4.4) - (A4.10),   if condition (C2) holds. 
Proof of Observation 5.
From (4.4) - (4.6), the objective of the public enterprise is to:
  (A5.1)
Setting the partial derivative of (A5.1) with respect to p equal to zero and solving for p provides:
(A5.2)-7-
The corresponding analysis for the rival provides:
  (A5.3)
Solving (A5.2) and (A5.3) simultaneously provides:
 and  (A5.4)
  (A5.5)
where  
 can now be rewritten as:
  (A5.6)
subject to  (A5.4) and (A5.5).
Differentiating (A5.6) with respect to r provides:
  (A5.7)
From (A5.4) and (A5.5), 
     and        (A5.8)
Substituting (A5.8) into (A5.7), simplifying, and rearranging terms provides:
  (A5.9)
Since    and    by assumption, (A5.9) implies   which ensures 
Under the maintained assumptions,   Furthermore, from (A5.8) and (A5.9):
  (A5.10)
The inequality in (A5.10) holds because    and    Therefore,    -8-
Proof of Observation 6.
Let   denote the objective function of the public enterprise, as defined in expression (4.9). The
necessary conditions for a solution to    are:
    and       (A6.1)
where    (A6.2)
  and  (A6.3)
  (A6.4)
Since    and    (A6.1) implies that 
The second order conditions for an interior maximum require   and 
 where    Since 
if and only if  
From (A6.1) - (A6.4), Cramer’s rule implies:
  (A6.5)
From (A6.1) and (A6.2),
   as      (A6.6)
(A6.5) and (A6.6) imply     if    